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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

JASON ED WARD PAYNE,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20000497-CA
Priority No.2

:

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Due process and Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) work together to require the trial judge to
ensure that a full and fair sentencing proceeding occur. When the trial judge does not
afford counsel the opportunity to present mitigating factors at sentencing and otherwise
does not base the sentence on reliable and relevant information, obvious error occurs.
This error requires that the sentence be vacated without a harmless error review.
Moreover, the error was not harmless in this case where Payne was a candidate for
probation.
A defendant does not knowingly and voluntarily waive the constitutional right to
presence at sentencing unless he is informed that sentencing will proceed even if he is not
present. This rule, articulated in United States v. McPherson, 421 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir.
1969), has been embraced by a number of other courts. In fact, the United States
Supreme Court acknowledged in Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 113 S.Ct. 748,
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752,122 L.Ed.2d 25 (1993), that knowledge that a proceeding will be held even if the
defendant does not appear cannot be imputed to defendants. In addition, presence at
sentencing is of even more critical importance than it is at trial. The different policy
considerations governing the right to presence at sentencing require that a defendant not
be sentenced in his absence unless extraordinary circumstances such as those in State v.
Anderson. 929 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1996) exist.
ARGUMENT
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT SENTENCED PAYNE IN ABSENTIA TO THE MAXIMUM
ALLOWABLE SENTENCE WITHOUT ANY INPUT FROM THE
PARTIES AS TO THE APPROPRIATE SENTENCE.
A. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED UTAH R. CRIM. P. 22 AND DUE
PROCESS WHEN IT SENTENCED PAYNE WITHOUT CONSIDERING
RELEVANT AND RELIABLE INFORMATION AND WITHOUT
AFFORDING THE PARTIES THE OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK TO
SENTENCING.
(Point IA of Appellant's opening brief; Point III of State's brief)
The plain language of Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) places on the trial court the
obligation to give defense counsel and the prosecutor the opportunity to speak regarding
the nature of the sentence to be imposed. While Rule 22(a) mandates that the trial court
give defense counsel the opportunity to speak regarding factors relevant to sentencing,
due process as outlined in State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993) requires
that any sentence imposed by a trial judge be based on reliable and relevant information.

2
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Working together, Rule 22(a) and Johnson place the responsibility on the trial judge to
make sure that a fair sentencing proceeding which meets due process requirements
occurs. The error in failing to afford defense counsel the opportunity to speak on behalf
of her client and in otherwise failing to base the sentencing decision on reliable and
relevant information from the parties was obvious in light of Rule 22(a) and Johnson. See
generallv State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-1209 (Utah 1993) (plain error occurs where
an obvious error prejudices the defendant).
The obviousness of the error in failing to afford defense counsel the opportunity to
present information relevant to sentencing is bolstered by Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7)
(1999) which mandates that the trial judge receive any information regarding the
appropriate sentence which the parties desire to present. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7)
states, "[a]t the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or
information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the
appropriate sentence. The testimony, evidence, or information shall be presented in open
court and in the presence of the defendant."
Moreover, it is evident from the record that the trial judge precluded defense
counsel from speaking to sentencing and from completing her objections on the record.
R. 49:2-3. The flat words of the trial judge demonstrate that he interrupted defense
counsel when she was attempting to make her record and indicated that he did not want to
hear anything further. The trial judge's tone, gestures and facial expressions on the
3
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videotape may well offer additional indication that the trial judge precluded defense
counsel from speaking further to this issue. Under such circumstances, especially where
the error in not affording defense counsel the opportunity to address the court as to
sentencing, the due process and Rule 22(a) error which occurred in this case was
cognizable.
When error occurs under Johnson, the sentencing must be vacated and the case
remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071-75. In a case such as
the instant case where the trial judge did not afford the defendant the opportunity to speak
to sentencing and instead made the sentencing decision in a vacuum based solely on the
defendant's failure to appear at sentencing, conducting a harmless error review would not
serve the due process requirement of a full and fair sentencing. Indeed, because defense
counsel was not afforded the opportunity to discuss information relevant to sentencing,
the record necessarily would not include all information relevant to sentencing. Under
such circumstances, a harmless error review of the record to determine whether the error
in failing to allow defense counsel to fully address the sentencing issues and in failing to
consider reliable and relevant information would be ludicrous.
Even if a harmless error review were conducted, however, the sentence must be
vacated because Payne was harmed by the trial judge's failure to conduct a full
sentencing hearing. The state argues that the error was harmless because (1) the judge
was informed of mitigating factors at a previous hearing, and (2) "the likelihood of
4
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probation in this case was close to nil." State's brief at 17. Neither of these arguments
withstand scrutiny.
First, the state argues that because defense counsel presented mitigating evidence
regarding Payne's employment, substance abuse classes and high school diploma at a
previous hearing, the judge was fully informed of these mitigating factors. State's brief at
17. Obviously, the information from the previous hearing was not presented with a focus
on sentencing and, therefore, did not fully address factors relevant to sentencing. In
addition, there is little likelihood that a busy trial judge with a multitude of cases would
remember the specific information pertinent to Payne's pretrial release when he sentenced
Payne in absentia a month and a half later. Hence, the fact that defense counsel provided
the judge with a bit of information about Payne at a pretrial hearing does not make the
error in failing to afford defense counsel the opportunity to fully present mitigating
information at sentencing harmless.
Second, the state argues that Payne would not have been a candidate for probation
because Payne failed to meet with AP&P in order to prepare a presentence report and
failed to appear at sentencing. State's brief at 18. Even if a defendant's failure to appear
at sentencing were an appropriate factor to consider in rendering sentence, the trial court
nevertheless must have a complete picture of the defendant's background and the nature
of the crime in order to conduct a full and fair sentencing proceeding. See State v.
McClendon. 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1980) ("A sentence in a criminal case should be
5
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appropriate for the defendant in light of his background and the crime committed and also
serve the interests of society which underlie the criminal justice system.")- In other
words, even if failing to appear at sentencing were a basis for sentencing more harshly,
the trial judge nevertheless was required to afford the parties an opportunity to speak
regarding sentencing, and to make the sentencing decision based on a complete review of
reliable and relevant information. In this case where the minimal information in the
record from a previous hearing shows that Payne had gotten his high school diploma, was
attending substance abuse classes and held two jobs, and the crime itself involved simple
possession of methamphetamine, Payne was a candidate for probation even though he did
not appear at sentencing.
In addition, common sense dictates that imposing a maximum sentence based
solely on a failure to appear at sentencing can result in an unfair sentence with a profound
impact on the criminal justice resources. While ramifications for irresponsible behavior
in regard to court dates should and do exist1, the sentence itself should be based on a more
complete view of the nature of the crime and the background of the defendant. In current
circumstances where the Salt Lake County jail is releasing inmates due to overcrowding
pursuant to a federal consent decree, filling the jail with misdemeanants who may be

1

When a defendant fails to appear at sentencing, the trial judge can issue a bench
warrant for the defendant's arrest. The arrest itself and subsequent time spent in jail
while waiting to see the judge are sufficient ramifications for failing to appear at
sentencing.
6
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irresponsible regarding court dates but who otherwise do not present a serious threat to
society nor deserve a severe punishment makes little sense.
Moreover, the case cited by the state, State v. Hoover, 728 P.2d 689, 691 (Ariz.
App. 1986), in support of its claim that imposing a maximum sentence based solely on a
failure to appear at sentencing is permissible, indicates only that absconding from the
jurisdiction is one of the factors a trial judge may consider at sentencing. In fact, in
Hoover, the court held that it was permissible to aggravate the defendant's sentence based
on his prior criminal history and the fact that he had absconded from the jurisdiction
between trial and sentencing. Id at 691. This contrasts with the present case where the
trial judge apparently imposed the maximum sentence based solely on the failure to
appear at sentencing. In addition, Payne's nonappearance at sentencing is a less serious
transgression than absconding from the jurisdiction.
By failing to afford defense counsel the opportunity to present information
relevant to sentencing and by otherwise failing to folly consider the nature of the crime,
the background of the defendant and other information relevant to sentencing, the trial
judge erred. This error requires that the sentence be vacated and the case remanded for a
new sentencing.
B. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
SENTENCING PAYNE IN ABSENTIA.
(Point IB of Appellant's Brief; Point I of Appellee's Brief)

7
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The state incorrectly claims that the trial judge's decision to sentence Payne in
absentia should be reviewed for clear error. State's brief at 7. State v. Anderson, 929
P.2d 1107, 1108 (Utah 1996) directs that the issue of whether a trial judge properly
sentenced a defendant in absentia involves a question of law which is reviewed for
correctness. Id Moreover, when an appellate court reviews questions as to
voluntariness, the ultimate issue as to whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily
waived a right is reviewed for correctness. See generally State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433,
438 (Utah App. 1996) (reviewing ultimate conclusion as to whether consent to search was
voluntary for correctness). Regardless of whether the findings and conclusions
characterize a voluntariness determination as a factual finding, the trial judge's ultimate
conclusion in this case that Payne should be sentenced in absentia because he knowingly
and voluntarily waived his right to presence is reviewed for correctness.
The right to presence at trial and the right to presence at sentencing are distinct
rights which are controlled by distinct policy considerations. See United States v. Turner,
532 F. Supp. 913, 915 (1982); State v. Fettis, 664 P.2d 208, 209 (Ariz. 1983). While
trying a defendant in absentia may be appropriate in some cases, different considerations
and stricter controls should apply when deciding whether to sentence a defendant in
absentia. See Turner, 532 F. Supp. at 915; Fettis, 664 P.2d at 209. The reason for this
distinction is that while a defendant's decision to absent himself from trial Mmay
immobilize or frustrate the justice system,1' such a danger "has largely although not
8
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entirely disappeared" after the defendant has been convicted. Turner, 532 F. Supp. at
915. Conversely, presence at sentencing is of critical importance to a full and fair
sentencing hearing." Id.; see also Fettis, 532 F. Supp. at 915. The minimal risk
associated with the delay of an appeal and possible retrial caused by failing to appear at
sentencing is therefore far outweighed by importance of presence at a sentencing hearing.
Turner, 532 F. Supp. at 915.
"[T]he common law has traditionally required that the defendant be present at his
sentencing." Id.: see also United States v. Lastra. 973 F.2d 952, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(citation omitted) ("'The requirement that the defendant be present when sentence is
passed has deep common law origins.'"). Presence is of critical importance to sentencing
not only because it allows the judge to be presented with all of the information needed for
a full sentencing hearing, but it also allows the judge to question and admonish the
defendant. Indeed, "[i]t is only when the defendant is before the court that a reasonable
and rational sentencing can take place." Fettis, 664 P.2d at 209.
Presence is of instrumental value to the defendant for the exercise of other
rights, such as to present mitigating evidence and challenge aggravating
evidence, and it may also be advantageous to him that the decision maker
be required to face him. The state may have an interest in the presence of
the defendant in order that the example of personal admonition might deter
others from similar crimes. Moreover, it may sometimes be important that
the convicted man be called to account publicly for what he has done, not to
be made an instrument of the general deterrent, but to acknowledge
symbolically his personal responsibility for his acts and to receive
personally the official expression of society's condemnation for his
conduct. The ceremonial rendering ofjudgment may also contribute to the
9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

individual deterrent force of the sentence if the latter is accompanied by
appropriate judicial comment on the defendant's crime.
Turner, 532 F. Supp. at 915.
In addition to ensuring that a full and fair sentencing occur, presence of the
defendant at sentencing preserves the dignity of individuals being sentenced as well as the
system itself.
Respect for the dignity of the individual is at the base of the right of a man
to be present when society authoritatively proceeds to decide and announce
whether it will deprive him of liberty. It shows a fundamental lack of
respect for the dignity of a man to sentence him in absentia. The presence
of the defendant indicates that society has sufficient confidence in the
justness of its judgment to announce it in public to the convicted man
himself. Presence thus enhances the legitimacy and acceptability of both
sentence and conviction.
Turner, 532 F. Supp. at 915-916 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The important
policy considerations relating to presence at sentencing "militate against a rule allowing
presence at sentencing to be waived." Id at 915.
Because of the critical importance of presence to sentencing, many jurisdictions
refuse to allow sentencing in absentia except in extraordinary circumstances. Fettis, 664
P.2d at 209. Such extraordinary circumstances, while "rare indeed" (Fettis, 664 P.2d at
209), include circumstances where a defendant has expressly waived his right to be
present at sentencing. See Turner, 532 F. Supp. at 916 (citing United States v. Brown,
456 F.2d 1112, 1114 (5th Cir. 1972), cert, denied, 415 U.S. 960, 94 S.Ct. 1490, 39
L.Ed.2d 575 (1974)). Extraordinary circumstances allowing sentencing in absentia may
10
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also include circumstances where the defendant has been fully informed that sentencing
will proceed in his absence if he does not appear at the sentencing hearing. See Lowery
v. State. 759 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Ark. 1988) (court unwilling to find defendant waived right
to presence at sentencing nin the absence of language specifically advising an accused
that he is subject to being sentenced prospectively without his being present"); People v.
Link. 685 N.E.2d 624, 626 (111. App. 1997) (court requires that defendant must be
"warned his failure to appear may result in the proceedings continuing in absentia" in
order to sentence a defendant in absentia); People v. Bennett. 557 N.Y.S.2d 731, 732
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (court reasons that sentencing in absentia was permissible where
defendant was fully advised that sentencing would occur in his absence if he failed to
appear); People v. Harris. 564 N.Y.S.2d 481 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (same); People v.
Christopher R.. 522 N.Y.S.2d 28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (same).
These cases requiring that the defendant be informed that sentencing will proceed
if he fails to appear in order to sentence in absentia adopt the standard outlined in
McPherson. 421 F.2d at 1129 and advocated by Payne in his opening brief at 14-15.
Contrary to the state's assertion on pages 9-11 of its brief, the McPherson rationale that a
defendant cannot knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to presence at sentencing
unless he is informed that sentencing will proceed in his absence remains good law and is
supported by a number of decisions. In addition, the state's claim that Taylor v. United
States. 414 U.S. 17 (1973) "effectively overruled" McPherson (state's brief at 10) is
11
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disproved by the existence of these post-Taylor cases applying the rationale utilized in
McPherson.
A review of Taylor itself also demonstrates that Taylor does not preclude the
McPherson analysis or otherwise "effectively overrule" McPherson. Significantly, Taylor
involved a defendant's failure to appear at trial rather than sentencing. Taylor, 414 U.S.
at 19. Because different policy considerations and analyses govern the issue of whether a
trial can proceed when a defendant is absent than govern the issue of whether sentencing
can proceed without the presence of the defendant, the holding in Taylor does not impact
on McPherson.
Moreover, since Taylor absented himself after the trial had started, Taylor's
knowledge that the proceedings which had already begun would be concluded in his
absence was evident. See Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 256, 113 S.Ct. 748,
749, 122 L.Ed.2d 25 (1993) (recognizing that mid-trial flight demonstrates a knowing and
voluntary waiver of the right to be present whereas nonappearance at the beginning of
trial does not demonstrate such waiver). Subsequent to Taylor, the United States
Supreme Court recognized the distinction between absenting oneself after trial has begun
and not appearing at all. Id. at 752. Accordingly, the Court held that a trial in absentia
could not be held pursuant to Fed. Rule Crim. P. 43 when a defendant was not present at
the beginning of trial. Id. at 752-753.

12
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The Supreme Court's analysis in Crosby provides further support for the
McPherson requirement that a defendant must be informed that sentencing will proceed in
his absence if he does not appear in order to knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to
presence at sentencing. The Supreme Court recognized that it cannot be assumed that a
defendant who fails to appear knows that the proceedings will go on without him. The
Court stated, M'[s]ince the notion that trial may be commenced in absentia still seems to
shock most lawyers, it would hardly seem appropriate to impute knowledge that this will
occur to their clients." Crosby, 113 S.Ct. at 752 (citation omitted). In this case where
Payne did not absent himself after the proceeding had begun and instead did not appear at
the beginning of the proceeding, Taylor does not require a determination that Mr. Payne
waived his right to presence.
The Annotation cited by the state demonstrates that a significant number of
jurisdictions require something more than a failure to appear in order to proceed with
sentencing in the defendant's absence. See State's brief at 11 (citing Christopher Hall,
Annotation, Voluntary Absence ofAccused When sentence is Pronounced, 59 A.L.R. 5th
135 (1998)). Rather than demonstrating a clear majority position, the Annotation shows
that a number ofjurisdictions ordinarily require that a defendant be present for sentencing
when the defendant has not been warned of the consequences for failing to appear. Id. at
149-153, 158.

13
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The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Anderson is consistent with the McPherson
approach and must be read in light of the facts and policy considerations relevant to the
circumstances under which Anderson failed to appear. Because Anderson was warned of
the consequences of failing to appear and had signed a written waiver of his right to
presence in which he agreed to be tried in absentia, requiring that a defendant be warned
of the consequences of nonappearance in order to find a knowing waiver of the right to
presence fits squarely within the Anderson holding. See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110.
Relying on McPherson, the Anderson court stated, f,[t]o intentionally relinquish the right
to be present, the defendant must have notice of the proceedings. United States v.
McPherson, 421 F.2d 1127, 1130 (D.C. 1969)." Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110. Since the
notice required in McPherson was that sentencing would proceed without the defendant if
he did not appear, and the defendant in Anderson likewise had notice that the proceedings
would continue without him if he did not appear, this reliance on McPherson in Anderson
should be read as requiring that the defendant be given notice that the sentencing will
occur even if he does not appear in order to sentence in absentia.
Anderson is distinguishable from the present case because the trial court properly
tried Anderson in absentia based on a written waiver. The Supreme Court looked to
similar circumstances where a defendant was properly tried in absentia and had still not
shown up by the time of sentencing. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110. Because it would
create an anomaly to be able to try in absentia a defendant who affirmatively waived his
14
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right to presence but to then be unable to sentence him, the Supreme Court held that
sentencing Anderson in absentia after he had expressly waived his right to presence at
trial was appropriate. Id. The Anderson court did not consider, however, the current
circumstances where a defendant had entered a plea but later failed to appear at
sentencing.
The present case is also distinguishable from Anderson because the balance
between society's interest in sentencing in absentia and Anderson's interest in being
present tipped in favor of proceeding with sentencing, whereas in the present case, the
balance tipped in favor of not proceeding with the sentencing in absentia. Anderson had
left the state with the permission of the court. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1108. He executed
a "written and oral agreement to be tried in his absence should he fail to appear at trial."
Id. "Although Anderson contacted pretrial services shortly before the trial date, he
subsequently disappeared." Id. Because Anderson knew he would be tried in absentia
and disappeared while out of state, the Court reasoned that Anderson could remain absent
from the jurisdiction for years, thereby impeding the administration ofjustice. Id at
1111. By contrast, as set forth in Payne's opening brief at 18, the potential for Payne
absenting himself for years did not exist in this case where Payne had lived at the same
address for twelve years and had held the same job for five years. R. 7.
As a final matter, Rules 22(b) and 17(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure do not preclude a requirement that a defendant be warned that sentencing will
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proceed without him if he does not appear in order to have a knowing and voluntary
waiver of the right to presence at sentencing. Rule 22(b) allows a defendant to be
sentenced in his absence, "[o]n the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in
defendant's absence." Rule 17(a)(2) states, "the defendant's voluntary absence from trial
after notice to defendant of the time for trial shall not prevent the case from being tried
and a verdict or judgment entered therein shall have the same effect as if the defendant
had been present."
When read togther, Rules 22(b) and 17(a)(2) arguably refer to the Anderson
situation, clarifying that if a defendant is tried in absentia, he miay also be sentenced if he
later fails to appear at sentencing. In other words, the "same grounds" referred to in
Rule 22(b) are the grounds that made the trial in absentia permissible. Morever,
Rule 17(a)(2) clarifies that a defendant's absence will not prevent him from being tried,
but does not outline all of the considerations for proceeding with a trial in absentia. The
rules must be interpreted to comply with constitutional requirements. See State v. Mohl
901 P.2d 991, 995 (Utah 1995). In order to comply with the constitutional right to
presence found in Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution, the rules must be read to
allow the court to proceed in the defendant's absence only if the defendant knowingly and
voluntarily waives his right to presence; for there to be a knowing waiver, the defendant
must be informed that sentencing will proceed even if he is not present. See discussion in
Appellant's opening brief at 13-18; supra at 8-13. The notice and grounds required to
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sentence a defendant in absentia therefore include notice that the hearing will proceed if
the defendant does not appear.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION
This case presents an important question as to whether a trial judge can sentence a
criminal defendant in absentia when the defendant was not informed that the sentencing
would occur in his absence. The circumstances in this case differ substantially from those
in Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107 and require clarification from this Court as to (1) whether a
distinction exists between sentencing a defendant in absentia where the defendant has
executed a written waiver of the right to presence at trial, and sentencing a defendant in
absentia where the defendant has appeared for trial proceedings but fails to appear at
sentencing, and (2) whether a defendant must be informed that sentencing will proceed if
he does not appear in order to have a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to
presence at sentencing. In addition, this case raises an important issue as to whether the
trial judge is required to ensure that a full and fair sentencing proceeding occurs by
affording counsel the opportunity to present any information relevant to sentencing he or
she desires. The significant number of defendants being sentenced in absentia by a single
trial judge to serve maximum sentences and the concomitant drain on resources without
serving criminal justice purposes requires that this issue be fully analyzed and explored,
and that a controlling decision be issued.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant Jason Edward Payne respectfully requests that this Court
vacate his sentence and remand the case for a full and fair sentencing hearing.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /f^

day of December, 2000.

Q.cL
JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

ANDREA J. GARLAND
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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